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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational Commercial Law, 
Arbitration, Mediation and Energy Law at the International Hellenic University.  
This essay focuses on the two key EU Directives that affected most the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights across-borders. At first, all European directives related to the 
examined issue since 1968 are mentioned. Following, Directives 2007/36/EC and (EU) 
2017/828 are analysed and discussed declaring some of the deficiencies of their 
establishment. Afterwards, there is a critical evaluation of the Directives and some 
proposals for reforms are submitted. The essay ends with conclusions.  
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1. Introduction 
It was at the beginning of the 21st century when European Union law started worrying 
about the rights and obligations of shareholders. The protection of the interests of the 
stakeholders and third parties was the main issue, whereas corporations and 
shareholders were faced only as participants in a significant market according to 
financial and economic terms. Securities were dealt as products rather than tools and 
their holders as consumers. As a result, the partners exercised their rights by 
participating in the General Meeting (GM) of shareholders.  
The participation of shareholders in corporate governance matters and the exercise of 
their rights are the cornerstone of the operation of companies and, by extension, the 
movement of the economy. However, the investment approach of the shareholders not 
involving themselves in the social policy of the companies led the EU to establish a series 
of corporate governance principles and rules, which since then began addressing this 
topic from the stock markets’ point of view, prioritising the shareholders of listed 
companies on regulated markets. 
The European Shareholders Rights Directive sought to ensure the prompt cross-border 
exercise of shareholders' rights, nonetheless the financial crisis of 2008 revealed its 
deficiencies and the need for the establishment of a revised edition. Although not all 
Member States have adopted yet measures necessary to comply with the new Directive, 
however, it is foreseen that the revised edition will not supersede more obstacles than 
the previous one.  
More specifically, Directive 2007/36/EC established rules to support the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights in General Meetings of companies, having their registered office in 
a Member State of the European Union and listed on an official stock exchange. It also 
aimed to take into account the opportunities presented by modern technology1. The 
aforementioned Directive was reviewed by the Directive (EU) 2017/828 concerning 
matters relating to the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and 
                                                 
1 Eur-Lex Access to European Union Law, “Summary of Directive 2007/36/EC – Directive 2007/36/EC the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders 
in listed companies” (OJ L 184, 14.7.2007, pp. 17–24), last update 26.11.2015, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/EN/uriserv:l33285 
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transparency in listed companies. This Directive aims at abolishing the weaknesses of 
shareholders’ control of specific decision-making procedures, developing the 
supervision of the management body and encouraging the long-term engagement of 
shareholders. 
The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to comprehend the framework of European 
corporate governance and the exercise of shareholders' rights, and then to examine the 
complications and difficulties of this framework that emerged due to the financial crisis. 
It is crucial for one to understand the mental approach of shareholders and thus their 
level of participation in a company’s run, the reasons that lead them to participate or 
not to in corporate governance, how the Directives have contributed into shareholders’ 
engagement and whether there can be amendments in the future.  
This essay will be structured as follows. In the second chapter, Directives since 1968 will 
be outlined and discussed regarding their affect they had upon shareholders’ rights. 
Following, in the third chapter Directive 2007/36/EC will be discussed, while in the 
fourth chapter Directive (EU) 2017/828 will be analysed. Finally, before the conclusion, 
there will be a chapter referring to a critical evaluation upon the last Directive and some 
proposals for amendments will be deposited.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  -3- 
 
  -5- 
2. Directives which Have Affected Shareholders’ Rights since 1968 
Before analysing the two key Directives, critical aspects of the Directives, which have so 
far affected the rights of shareholders, are highlighted in this chapter, which is 
structured as follows. Initially, the Directives that have affected shareholders’ rights 
since 1968 will be outlined and afterwards, a brief commentary is made on the course 
followed by the European Parliament and the Council regarding these Directives. 
2.1. Since 1968 until Shareholders Rights Directive 2017/828  
Since 1968 fourteen Directives have been introduced establishing rights and obligations 
of shareholders until the introduction of Directive 2007/36/EU (of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of 
shareholders in listed companies), known as the Shareholders’ Rights Directive I. This 
Directive was later amended with the publishment of Directive EU 2017/828 (of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC 
as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement), known as the 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive II. For better comprehension of the issues elaborating in 
this essay, a review of some crucial points of the previous fourteen Directives will take 
place. 
1. Directive 68/151/EEC2 
This Directive established the obligatory publication of data3, the publication of all 
information related to the company in the national paper of each Member State (MS), 
the reveal of the publication date of the above information and rules regarding the 
responsibility of the founders of the company. 
2. Directive 77/91/EEC4 
                                                 
2 First Council Directive 68/151/EEC on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the 
interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the 
second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent 
throughout the Community [1968].This Directive is no longer in force.  
3 Such as the amendments made to the company structure. 
4 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the 
interests of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent throughout the Community [1976]. This Directive is no longer in force.  
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The Directive establishes a frame of protection of the interest of partners and third 
parties related to the companies, in respect of the maintenance, increase or reduction 
of the capital and the formation of the companies. Due to this, the Directive establishes 
specific requirements related to issues of disclosure of information. The articles of 
association must include information, such as type and name of the company; the 
amount of capital and its reduction or increase amendments; duration of the company; 
rules related to the persons responsible for the management of the company; its 
registered office; distribution of dividends; and other related data. Moreover, there are 
provisions included which ensure the equal treatment of the shareholders and the 
protection of creditors.  
3. Directive 92/101/EEC5 
All companies included in the first Directive hold the majority of the voting rights directly 
or indirectly, or they can exercise a dominant influence. This case exists when a third 
country's law governs the company, provided that the legal form is comparable.  
4. Directive 2003/51/EC6 
This Directive establishes the promotion of the legibility of financial and non-financial 
data designated to shareholders and the public.   
5. Directive 2003/58/EC7 
Electronic means are established, and the obligation to publish information in the paper 
is abolished. Moreover, reporting obligation of shareholders is introduced via this mean.  
6. Directive 2003/6/EC8 
                                                 
4 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the 
interests members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the 
second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability 
companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent [1976]. This Directive is no longer in force.  
5 Council Directive 92/101/EEC amending Directive 77/91/EEC on the formation of public limited- liability 
companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital [1992]. This Directive is no longer in force.  
6 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 
83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and consolidated accounts of certain types of 
companies, banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings [2003]. This Directive is in 
force.  
7 Directive 2003/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 
68/151/EEC, as regards disclosure requirements in respect of certain types of companies [2003]. This 
Directive is no longer in force.  
8 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse) [2003]. This Directive is no longer in force.  
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The Market Abuse Directive determines and forbids market manipulation and insider 
dealing, and also determines the conditions for buyback programs.  
7. Directive 2003/71/EC9 
The Prospectus Directive engages with stock exchange harmonisation, focuses more on 
financial and transferable securities, defines categories of investors10 and mentions the 
problems related to best practices followed by companies regarding transparency and 
systemic risk.  
8. Directive 2004/25/EC11  
This Company takeover bids Directive introduces methods of the national supervisory 
authorities’ growth in stock market areas and clarifies relations between shareholders 
and the main bodies of the companies. More specifically, clarifies issues such as 
securities and attached voting rights, operation related information, protection of 
minority shareholders and transparency issues, monitoring and establishment of codes.   
9. Directive 2004/109/EC12 
The Issuers of securities - transparent information Directive aims to improve information 
supplied to investors about issuers of securities admitted to trading on a regulated 
market, located or operating in an EU country. MSs have to publish periodic financial 
information on their income throughout the fiscal year, in addition to continuous 
information concerning the possession of significant percentages of voting rights.13 
10.  Directive 2005/56/EC14 
                                                 
9 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published 
when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC 
[2003]. This Directive is in force.  
10 Categories of qualified and unqualified investors.  
11 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on takeover bids [2004]. This 
Directive is in force. 
12 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC [2004]. This Directive is in force.  
13 Eur-Lex Access to European Union Law, “Summary of Directive 2004/109/EC – transparency 
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a 
regulated market” <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/LSU/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2004.390.01.0038.01.ENG> last update 30.11.2015 
14 Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on cross-border mergers of limited 
liability companies [2005]. This Directive is no longer in force.  
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The Cross-border mergers of limited liability companies Directive focuses on the 
protection of shareholders through the publication of the draft terms, the approval of 
the GM, determines various effects on shareholders and the protection of employees. 
11. Directive 2006/43/EC15 
The statutory audit — ensuring accurate company financial statements Directive 
concentrates on the harmonisation of auditing and more specifically on the moral 
dimension of auditing, to ensure reliable information to shareholders.  
12. Directive 2006/46/EC16 
The specific Directive refers to the principle of ‘comply or explain’, making companies 
publish the annual corporate governance statement. Shareholders thus are being 
informed concerning the responsibility of the management, supervisory and 
administrative bodies.  
13. Directive 2006/48/EC17 
The taking-up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions Directive identifies the 
risks run by credit institutions as a result of their activities. It lays down the requirements 
for taking up and pursuing the business of credit institutions and contains provisions on 
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, relations with third countries 
and the principles of and technical instruments for prudential supervision.18  
14. Directive 2006/68/EC19 
The Directive focuses on public limited liability companies and any alteration concerning 
their capital and the prevention of market abuse. Any capital related alteration concerns 
                                                 
15 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audits of annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and 
repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC [2006]. This Directive is in force.  
16 Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 
78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, 
86/635/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions 
and 91/674/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings [2006]. This 
Directive is in force. 
17 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) [2006]. This Directive is no longer in force. 
18 Eur-Lex Access to European Union Law, “Summary of Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
(recast)”, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/LSU/?uri=CELEX:32006L0048> last update 
22.03.2011 
19 Directive 2006/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 
77/91/EEC as regards the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and 
alteration of their capital [2006]. This Directive is no longer in force.  
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not only the bodies of the company but the shareholders’ meetings, too. Moreover, 
attention is given to the protection of minority shareholders, the publication of 
operations, decisions, and others.  
        15. The Directive 2007/36/EC along with Directive EU 2017/828 are going to be 
discussed further in this essay.  
2.2. Commentary 
The companies and the shareholders have been beneficial to the movement of the 
economy since decades. Thus, from a very early stage, it is observed that it was 
considered necessary to disclose the financial data of the companies and, on a second 
level, those of the shareholders. The European Parliament afterwards established the 
publication of these data be by electronic means so that access would be more 
accessible. Consequently, this transparency should attract more investors to the 
companies. 
However, the most important objective of all was to achieve shareholders' participation 
in corporate issues to develop and establish a practice based on long-term rather than 
short-term goals. As a result, the Directives 2007/36/EC and 2017/828 (EU) were voted, 
and they established provisions and rules regarding shareholders’ rights at GMs and 
their engagement in the corporate structure and decision-making procedures. The 
Directive 2007/36/EC will be discussed in the next chapter, while the Directive 2017/828 
(EU) will be analysed in the third chapter of this essay.   
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3. Directive 2007/36/EC 
In this chapter, the Directive of Shareholders’ Rights is being discussed. At first, crucial 
points of this Directive are mentioned. Then, the reasons that led to the proposal of its 
establishment are outlined. Following, the main aims of the Directive are underlined, 
while in the fourth section the key provisions are analysed. Finally, some of the 
deficiencies of the Directives are being featured.  
3.1. Introduction  
In 2007 the Directive 2007/36/EC on the exercise of shareholders’ rights (the “SRD I” or 
the “Directive” hereof) was formally adopted, and it comprised a part of EU law. The 
main purpose of this directive is to establish minimum rights for shareholders in listed 
companies throughout the European Union. The proposed Directive seeks “to ensure 
that shareholders, no matter where in the EU they reside, have timely access to complete 
information and simple means to exercise certain rights – notably voting rights – at a 
distance”20. Now, the Prospectus Directive21 concentrates on data that issuers are 
obliged to disclose on admission to the market, while the Transparency Directive22 
engages with data which corporations need to make available regarding company 
meetings. However, none of the two Directives deals with issues relating shareholders’ 
voting rights. Consequently, it was crucial that a new Directive was proposed having a 
primary objective of the protection of investors and the promotion of an active exercise 
of rights of shareholders attaching to voting shares. 
3.2. Proposal for the establishment of SRD I 
The Commission’s proposal for a directive was adopted on July 11, 2007, and published 
on July 14, 2007. On August 3, 2007, the SRD I entered into force and the 
implementation of the Directive should take place by the MSs within two years in their 
national laws. 
                                                 
20 European Commission, Press Release, “Corporate governance: Commission proposals to make it easier 
for shareholders to exercise their rights within the EU”, IP/06/10, 10 January 2006, Brussels. 
21 See ref. 6, Directive 2003/71/EC. 
22 See ref. 12, Directive 2004/109/EC. 
  -12- 
The problems that led the Commission to the decision of submitting this Directive were 
mainly mere that needed reconstruction. Shareholders did not get knowledge of the 
information on GMs in time, and they could not trade their shares before the GM so 
they could vote. Moreover, they were usually obliged to go in person to the GMs, even 
though these meetings were held in another MS due to the lack of existence of effective 
rules on representation and distant voting23. Therefore, the 2003 Commission’s 
Communication suggested proposals to improve the shareholders’ rights, whose shares 
are involved in listed companies, so the problem of long-distance voting is settled. 
In 2003, the Commission in its communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament determined that shareholders of listed companies should be able to have 
access to some specific information prior to the GM via electronic means. Furthermore, 
it noticed, that “there is a need for enhancing the exercise of a series of shareholders' 
rights in listed companies (right to ask questions, to table resolutions, to vote in absentia, 
to participate in general meetings via electronic means). These facilities should be 
offered to shareholders across the EU, and specific problems relating to cross-border 
voting should be solved urgently. The Commission considers that the necessary 
framework should be developed in a Directive, since an effective exercise of these rights 
requires a number of legal difficulties to be solved. In view of the important benefits 
expected from such a framework, the Commission regards the relevant proposal as a 
priority for the short term”24. 
In 2004, the European Parliament in its Resolution supported Commission’s intentions 
as it (European Parliament) “considers that it is necessary in all cases to distinguish 
between large and small shareholders, mainly as regards the use of modern technology 
in the exercise of shareholders' voting rights, given that small shareholders are usually 
more at risk”; and “supports the Commission in its intention to strengthen shareholders' 
rights in particular through extension of the rules on transparency, proxy voting rights, 
                                                 
23 Press Release, European Commission, “Commissioner Charlie McCreevy welcomes European Parliament 
vote on Shareholder Voting Rights in first reading”, Brussels (15 February 2007) IP/07/193 
24 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – “Modernising 
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward” /* 
COM/2003/0284 final */  
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the possibility of participating in general meetings via electronic means and ensuring 
that cross-border voting rights are able to be exercised”25. 
3.3. Main aims of the establishment of the SRD I 
The SRD I secures minimum rights to shareholders of corporates whose shares are 
traded on a regulated market, such as having timely access to the relevant information 
before the GM and offering specific means for distance voting26. It repeals share 
blocking and institutes minimum standards for the rights to pose questions, state issues 
on the GM agenda and propose resolutions. Member States, on the other hand, are 
allowed to pursue any other measures to ease the exercise of the rights mentioned in 
the Directive.  
Overall, the Directive introduces the following main aims: 
• the obligation of companies to inform shareholders with specific information 
related to the GMs. A minimum notice period of 21 days to shareholders for most 
GMs, a period which can be reduced to 14 days. Also, information such as the 
location, agenda, date, voting description and participation procedures need to 
be published on the company’s website; 
• the obligation of companies to provide other data and information to 
shareholders, namely the total number of shares and voting rights, draft 
resolution for the GM, documents and forms need to be used by proxy27;  
• shareholders may vote electronically. Any obstacles regarding the electronic 
participation in the GM are being removed, including electronic voting, subject 
only to restrictions that are compulsory for the verification of identity of voters;  
• repeal of share blocking and the establishment of a record date28 in all MSs 30 
days before the GM;  
                                                 
25  European Parliament resolution on the communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: “Modernising company law and enhancing corporate governance in the European 
Union - a plan to move forward” (COM (2003) 284 – C5-0378/2003 – 2003/2150(INI)) (Strasbourg, 21 April 
2004). 
26 Press Release, European Commission, “Corporate governance: Directive on shareholders' rights formally 
adopted”, (Brussels ,12 June 2007) IP/07/800  
27 It is referred when one shareholder authorises other one to represent him/her at the General Meeting). 
28 It is referred to a certain date indicated by the company where a shareholder is obliged to have officially 
owned shares, so he is able to participate and vote in General Meetings.  
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• the possibility of shareholders to set questions related to the agenda and have 
them answered, to put items on the agenda29 and table draft resolutions;  
• the establishment of good corporate governance. Meaning the removal of any 
restrictions referring to the eligibility of people to act as a proxy holder and 
removal of immoderate formal requirements for the appointment of the latter; 
and  
• transparency of voting results through disclosure on the company’s Internet site.  
3.4. Key provisions of the Directive  
 As the European Commission stated “The Shareholders’ rights Directive introduces 
minimum standards to ensure that shareholders of companies whose shares are traded 
on a regulated market have a timely access to the relevant information ahead of the GM 
and simple means to vote at a distance. It also abolishes share blocking and introduces 
minimum standards for the rights to ask questions, put items on the GM agenda and 
table resolutions. The Directive allows Member States to take additional measures to 
facilitate further the exercise of the rights referred to in the Directive”30. 
The primary purpose of the establishment of this Directive is first to provide 
shareholders and other parties, who are interested in companies, protection. Also, to 
encourage the corporation to be set up anywhere in the European Union and enable 
these corporations in cooperating with each other, even though they have bases in 
different European countries. Lastly, through these actions corporations may be more 
competitive and efficient.31   
The main provisions of the SRD are the following. 
                                                 
29 This right is related to shareholders who have a 5% holding in the company’s capital.  
30 Press Release, European Commission, “Corporate governance: Directive on shareholders' rights formally 
adopted”, (Brussels, 12 June 2007) IP/07/800 
31 European Commission, Justice, Building a European Area of Justice, “Company law and corporate 
governance”, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/company-law/index_en.htm> 
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3.4.1. Article 4  
“The company shall ensure equal treatment for all shareholders who are in the same 
position with regard to participation and the exercise of voting rights in the general 
meeting”32.  
Concerning rights that are related to financial participation in the corporation’s profits33, 
take-overs34 and information that is related to a decision referring to investments35, EU 
law has obliged corporations to treat all shareholders with the same respect and treat 
them equally. Through this Directive, this equality-principle is extended to the voting 
procedures in the GMs.  
3.4.2. Article 5  
The issue of the access of shareholders to procedural information related to the 
meetings was introduced in the Transparency Directive. According to the latter, issuers 
have to make available data of the time, place and agenda of the meeting, the rights of 
holders to participate in meetings, the number of shares and voting rights36. Article 5 of 
the Directive expands these prerequisites. Because “shareholders should be able to cast 
informed votes at, or in advance of, the general meeting, no matter where they reside”37, 
the Directive demands for a timely notice and complete information referring to the 
agenda issues to be submitted. Moreover, the corporations may provide and make 
accessible any information regarding the GM to shareholders using modern technology.    
The Directive establishes a minimum notice period to shareholders for the company to 
issue convocation of the GM of twenty-one days before the GM38. This period, however, 
may be reduced to fourteen days under two conditions: shareholders can vote by 
electronic means, and the GM is not considered as the annual GM. This reduction shall 
                                                 
32 Article 4 of Directive 2007/36/EC 
33 Article 42 of the Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC on coordination of safeguards which, for the 
protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public 
limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such 
safeguards equivalent (hereinafter Capital Directive) [1976]. 
34 Article 3 (1) (a) of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids 
[2004]. 
35 Article 17 (1) of the Transparency Directive 
36 Article 17 (2) (a) of Transparency Directive 
37 Recital 6 of Directive 2007/36/EC 
38 Article 5 (1) (a) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
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be decided by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes attaching to the shares, 
or the subscribed capital and this decision may not last more than the date of the next 
annual GM39. For the second or the subsequent meeting, in case the first convocation 
did not occur due to lack of quorum, MSs do not need to apply the minimum notice 
periods referred previously40. This occurs provided that new items are not put on the 
agenda for the GM, and there is a gap of ten days between the final GM and the first 
date of GM.  
Companies, twenty-one days before the GM, have to upload on their website the 
information41 which follows: 
1. Convocation, indicating specific information, such as the place and the time of 
the meeting, and the agenda42. The convocation43 must include a clear and 
precise description of the relevant procedures that shareholders shall follow to 
exercise their rights44; 
2. Number of shares and voting rights (including separate shares for each class)45; 
3. Documents to be submitted to the GM46; 
4. Draft resolutions and comments by the bodies of the company or shareholders47; 
and 
                                                 
39 Article 5 (1) (b) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
40 Article 5 (1) (c) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
41 A company provides data to shareholders via the pull and the push method. According to the pull 
method, the company makes information available to shareholders who can access it at the “pre-
determined” place. 
42 Article 5 (3) (a) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
43 The convocation shall: according to Article 5 (3) (b) (i) of Directive 2007/36/EC contain deadlines, by 
which shareholders have the right to put items on the agenda and to table draft resolutions, in case these 
rights are exercised after the convocation, and to ask questions during or before the meeting; according 
to Article 5 (3) (b) (ii) of Directive 2007/36/EC contain the procedures regarding proxy voting, and more 
specifically, the forms and the means by which the companies are to accept the electronic appointment 
of proxy holders; according to Article 5 (3) (b) (iii) of Directive 2007/36/EC contain the procedures 
regarding casting voting by correspondence or by electronic means, where applicable; according to Article 
5 (3) (c) of Directive 2007/36/EC determine and include further information regarding the record date 
according to Article 7 par. 2 of the Directive; according to Article 5 (3) (d) of Directive 2007/36/EC indicate 
the source of the documents to be submitted to the GM and any draft resolutions; and according to Article 
5 (3) (e) of Directive 2007/36/EC the Internet address where all documents and information related to the 
GM will be uploaded.      
44 Article 5 (3) (b) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
45 Article 4 (b) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
46 Article 4 (c) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
47 Article 4 (d) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
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5. Forms relevant to proxy voting or voting by correspondence, unless these are 
sent directly to the shareholders48.  
The above information has to be available on the company’s website during all 
necessary period, initiating on the first date on which the notice is sent and terminating 
with the closure of the meeting. The company has to provide the information to 
shareholders “in a manner ensuring fast access to it on a non-discriminatory basis”49 50. 
3.4.3. Article 6  
The Directive offers to shareholders the possibility to (a) put items on the agenda 
(accompanied each item by justification or a resolution)51, (b) to table draft resolutions52 
and (c) to ask questions53, a right that will be discussed further on article 9. Regarding 
the first and second rights, these can be “exercised in writing”54.  
“The exercise of those rights should be made subject to two basic rules, namely that  
• any threshold required for the exercise of those rights should not exceed 5% of 
the company’s share capital and that  
• all shareholders should in every case receive the final version of the agenda in 
sufficient time to prepare for the discussion and voting on each item on the 
agenda”55.  
Member States have to set a specified number of days deadlines before the GM or the 
convocation56. On the other hand, if the exercise of these rights requires amendments 
of the agenda, then the company needs to make available the revised edition by 
uploading it on the company’s website, before the record date57.      
                                                 
48 Article 4 (e) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
49 Article 5 (2) (a) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
50 According to the “push” method, the company has to supply or send information to the shareholder.  
51 Article 6 (1) (a) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
52 Article 6 (1) (b) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
53 Article 9 of Directive 2007/36/EC 
54 Either by postal services or electronic means, see Article 6 (1) (3) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
55 Recital 7 of Directive 2007/36/EC 
56 Article 6 (3) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
57 Article 6 (4) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
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3.4.4. Article 7  
The Directive pays attention to some procedural details, requiring proportionality 
between the purpose and the procedure needed by a Member State and/or a company. 
More specifically, those details are (a) shareholder identity58, (b) exercise of proxy 
voting59, (c) obstacles on electronic participation60 and (d) voting by email. These issues 
will be discussed in this article and the next ones.  
“Obstacles which deter shareholders from voting, such as making the exercise of voting 
rights subject to the blocking of shares during a certain period before the general 
meeting, should be removed”61. The Directive establishes the record date system, based 
on which shareholders can have the right to vote at the GM, while their share can be 
traded afterwards62. In this way, share blocking is abolished, and shareholders are not 
abandoned from selling their shares after the GM. The record date system is required 
for companies that cannot identify their shareholders from a current register of 
shareholders on the day of the GM63 and it may last up to 30 days before the GM is 
concerned.     
Moreover, any other proposal, which prevents shareholders from selling or transferring 
shares since the record date until the GM, is prohibited64. Otherwise, investors have to 
deposit their shares prior the GM for a specific time of period until the end of it. This 
technique was frequently used under the law of particular MSs, which used this method 
as an alternative to the record date system regarding the corporate or intermediary 
level. Many institutional investors were observed that they were prevented from 
exercising their voting rights due to the requirement of these investors to be able to 
respond to market reactions65.  Consequently, the voting right is sterilised because of 
                                                 
58 Article 7 (1) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
59 Article 11 (2) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
60 Article 8 (2) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
61 Recital 3 of Directive 2007/36/EC 
62 Article 7 (2), (3) of Directive 2007/36/EC  
63 Article 7 (2) (b) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
64 Article 7 (1) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
65 Editorial: “Institutional Investors and Cross-border voting”, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 11 (2003), S. 89: Institutional Design. 
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the dysfunctional proceedings of distribution of pre-meeting data and to the tight record 
dates66. 
To sum up, the record date system tries to some level not to split the entitlement to 
vote and the ownership of shares. In cases where others than the beneficial owners 
were entitled to vote, such as nominees, votes were usually cast irrespectively of the 
beneficial owners’ interest. This would result in “hidden ownership” practices. Through 
the Directive provisions, however, nonetheless, this practice is being prevented 
partially, the issuer of the shares is still able to raise objections to the shareholder’s 
registration that it was a result of hiding ownership and illegal tactics rather than of 
reasonable economic interest67.  
3.4.5. Article 8  
Companies should not deal with barriers but provide shareholders with the possibility 
to participate in GMs by any means68. The MSs shall allow shareholders to participate in 
the GMs by electronic means, notably any or providing the following: 
- real-time transmission of the GM; 
- real-time two-way communication, permitting shareholders to participate in 
the GM from a remote location; and 
- a mechanism for casting votes, prior or during the GM, without the need of 
the presence of a proxy holder69.  
Member States are encouraged to adopt rules with the purpose of ensuring that all 
voting results reflect the objective of the shareholders in all circumstances70. 
                                                 
66 Masouros, Pavlos E., “Is the EU Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously? An Essay on the Impotence of 
Shareholdership in Corporate Europe” (October 3, 2010). European Company Law, Vol. 7, pp. 195-203, 
2010. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1686725> 
67 de Luca, Nicola, On Record Date, “Empty Voting, and Hidden Ownership - Some Remarks on EU Directive 
2007/36/Ce from a European Perspective” (July 2, 2010). Rivista di diritto societario, RDS, 2010/2, 311-
339. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1633749> 
68 Recital 9 of Directive 2007/36/EC 
69 Article 8 (1) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
70 Recital 9 of Directive 2007/36/EC 
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3.4.6. Article 9  
Every shareholder may ask questions “related to items on the agenda” of the GM and 
have them answered, while MSs shall set the rules “on how and when questions are to 
be asked and answered”71. The Member States, however, may consider that several 
answers have been given when relevant information is uploaded on the company’s 
website72.  
It is considered that the specific provision may broaden the opportunity of shareholders 
to set questions which their answers may jeopardise any economic or business interests 
of the company. The company, as a result, desiring not to disclose more information but 
to withhold it, it may cause the challenge of GM decisions by its shareholders73. It is, 
therefore, each MS’s responsibility to take the several measures regarding the frame 
based on which the shareholders may set their questions. 
3.4.7. Article 10  
“Good corporate governance requires a smooth and effective process of proxy 
holders”74. The Directive provides the possibility to every shareholder to appoint an 
individual or legal person as a proxy holder. Existing boundaries regarding proxy voting 
should, therefore, be abolished, and the proxy holder may have the same rights of the 
shareholder for the voting procedure75. Furthermore, a person who is a proxy holder 
may represent more than one shareholders holding proxies from different ones76. 
However, to exist good corporate governance, there have to be sufficient safeguards 
against a probable abuse of proxy voting. Proxy holder shall participate in the voting 
procedure according to the shareholder’s instructions77, while member States have the 
                                                 
71 Recital 8 of Directive 2007/36/EC 
72 Article 9 (2) (b) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
73 Kersting, Christian, “Broadening of the Right to Ask Questions as a Result of the Shareholders’ Rights 
Directive” (2007/36/EC) (Ausweitung des Fragerechts durch die Aktionärsrechterichtlinie) (December 7, 
2009). Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP), p. 2317, 2009; CBC-RPS No. 0045/09. Available at SSRN: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1520453> 
74 Recital 10 of Directive 2007/36/EC 
75 Article 10 (1) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
76 Article 10 (5) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
77 Article 10 (4) (a) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
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right to apply some restrictions for no other purpose other than to deal with potential 
conflict of interest78.  Such measures would constitute: 
- limitation on the appointment of a proxy holder to a unique meeting79;  
- limitation on the number of proxy holders referring to one shareholder, 
concerning Article 13 (5) of the Directive80;  
- disclosure of specific facts by the proxy holder to prove the lack of conflict of 
interest against the shareholder appointed81; 
- restriction or exclusion of the proxy holder who does not have specific 
instructions on how and what to vote82;83 
- restriction or exclusion of transfer of the proxy to another person; and 
- the requirement of keeping a record of the instructions given regarding the 
voting procedure by the proxy holder84.  
3.4.8. Article 12  
The companies offer the possibility to shareholders to participate in the voting 
procedures by correspondence before the GM.  
3.4.9. Article 13  
The specific article deals with the problem of shareholdings being held through a chain 
of intermediaries. Until the establishment of SRD I, shares are held through securities 
accounts with brokers and/or banks as intermediaries, who provide custodial services. 
These chains are often long, significantly complicated involving different jurisdictions 
while the intermediaries do not keep separate accounts. For instance, an investor in 
Member State A holds shares in an account with an intermediary in Member State A. 
This intermediary holds an account with a depository bank in Member State B. This bank 
                                                 
78 Article 10 (3) (a) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
79 Article 10 (2) (a) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
80 Article 10 (2) (b) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
81 Article 10 (3) (a) of Directive 2007/36/36/EC 
82 Article 10 (3) (b) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
83 The Directive, however, according to Recital 10 of the Directive, does not oblige companies to confirm 
that proxy holders vote according to the instructions possibly given by the appointing shareholders.   
84 Article 10 (4) (b) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
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holds an account with a local custodian in Member State C. Finally, this custodian is 
registered in the share register of the company85.  
 
Diagram A: Shareholding chain of securities accounts 
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                                                →                                                        →                                          
 
                                                                                                                            ↓ 
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Consequently, not only it is difficult to record an individual chain of securities account, 
but also it is therefore legally uncertain who is entitled to cast votes on behalf of whom 
in the end. The same complexity applies when proxy holders are involved in this chain, 
too.  
Therefore, according to the Directive, omnibus accounts are allowed to be held by 
professional intermediaries on behalf of shareholders86. The Member States, in the case 
that they have to settle some requirements, they may require a list to disclose to the 
company the identity of the holder, and the number of the shares voted87. Moreover, 
procedural requirements may require verification of voting instructions by the 
intermediary88. The holder of omnibus account may have the right to vote differently 
for each client89 and to provide a proxy to each client for the voting procedure90.  
The Directive does not solve central issues in the voting procedure, and these provisions 
are not sufficient to permit investor, who holds shares, to acknowledge how votes are 
eventually cast. However, it requires the Commission a further consideration “with a 
                                                 
85 Jaap Winter, “The shareholders´ rights directive and cross-border voting”, (June 2006) 
86 Article 13 (1) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
87 Article 13 (2) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
88Article 13 (3) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
89 Article 13 (4) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
90 Article 13 (5) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
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view to ensuring that investors have access to effective voting services and that voting 
rights are exercised in accordance with the instructions given by those investors”91.   
3.4.10. Article 14  
Companies shall determine for each resolution at least the number of shares for which 
votes have been given, the represented proportion of the share capital, the total 
number of votes, the number of votes in favour and against, and where applicable the 
number of absent voters. The results of the voting procedure shall be available on the 
company’s website within a period not exceeding fifteen days after the GM92.  
3.5. Conclusion  
The Directive, although it establishes solutions to some of the existing obstacles in 
corporate governance, however many of them remain troublesome. Firstly, it does not 
prescribe that Depositories and custodians shall cooperate, and because intermediaries 
do not have an economic interest in the voting procedures of the shareholders at the 
GMs93, they usually stay voluntarily uninvolved. Moreover, the Directive promoted and 
established the use of electronic means in all procedures, however, it does not 
determine the specific means, allowing, therefore, the companies to insert any 
technology94. This may prevent some individual shareholders from participating in the 
voting procedures due to high costs. Furthermore, under this Directive is not ensured 
that institutional investors have the chance to exercise their voting rights at the end, 
due to complex intermediary chains, while Depositories may freely impose high charging 
fees without being restricted upon a ceiling. Due to the above, many shareholders may 
remain passive. Consequently, it is observed that there are many gaps that this Directive 
has to fulfil, so the shareholder engagement may develop and be secured.   
 
                                                 
91 Recital 11 of Directive 2007/36/EC 
92 Article 14 (2) of Directive 2007/36/EC 
93 RC Nolan, “Shareholder Rights in Britain”, (2006) 7 European Business Organisation Law Review 549-
588 
94 Zetzsche, Dirk A., “Shareholder Passivity, Cross-Border Voting and the Shareholder Rights Directive” (July 
21, 2008). Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2008; CBC-RPS No. 0031. Available at SSRN: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1120915> 
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4. Directive (EU) 2017/828 
In this chapter, the first section will introduce the new SRD (II). Following the second 
section, many of the deficiencies of the Directive 2007/36/EC will be quoted, while in 
the third section, the aims of the European Commission, concerning the Directive’s 
amendment will be referred. In the fourth section, the principal amendments to the SRD 
I will be discussed, and subsequently the key provisions of the SRD II will be analysed. 
Lastly, there will be a comparison to the US approach noted.  
4.1. Introduction 
On 20 May 2017, the Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement 
of long-term shareholder engagement was published. The Shareholders’ Rights 
Directive was firstly published “with a view to enhancing shareholders’ rights in listed 
companies”. However, “the financial crisis revealed that shareholders in many cases 
supported managers’ excessive short-term risk-taking”95. This could lead to corporate 
governance and performance profoundly below the standard, and some action had to 
be taken. In December of 2012, therefore, the Commission in its communication 
announced its intention to modernise the corporate law and governance structure96. 
This new Directive shall aim to minimise the deficiencies in shareholders’ manner of 
control of specific decision-making procedures, to encourage their engagement in the 
long-term run and to enhance supervision of main bodies of the company. “Greater 
involvement of shareholders in corporate governance is one of the levers that can help 
improve the financial and non-financial performance of companies”97. Many measures 
in the new Directive have been inserted, and many have been amended. However, those 
with the more significant interest will be discussed further in Section 5 of this chapter.  
                                                 
95 Recital 2 of Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement [2017]. 
96 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Action Plan: 
European company law and corporate governance - a modern legal framework for more engaged 
shareholders and sustainable companies /* COM/2012/0740 final */, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0740> 
97 Recital 14 of Directive 2017/828 
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4.2. Addressing the problem 
The main issue concerning the liability of issuers towards shareholders is the voting 
right. In recent years, across borders ownership has been spread and demands for 
facilitation of voting procedures are increased. The financial crisis revealed a lack of 
shareholder engagement and many deficiencies in corporate governance.  
Despite the establishment of the 2007 Directive, investors had to overcome many 
barriers and obstacles in cross-border voting procedures, such as logistics, costs, 
regulations and legal requirements (including national), which made challenging to 
institutional and individual investors to exercise their rights and participate to 
proceedings of the company. Hereunder are going to be discussed in brief some of the 
leading problems in voting procedures and corporate governance, which led the 
Commission to revise the Directive of 2007.  
4.2.1. Obstacles to cross-border voting 
It was observed that the receipt of relevant documents and data sufficiently on time 
before GMs was a process troublesome. Despite the fact that electronic means were 
introduced to companies’ software and voting procedures, it remained difficult.  
4.2.2. Complex chain of intermediaries 
As this issue was discussed before, any information regarding shares which is 
transmitted from and to the issuer across borders is handled through a chain of 
intermediaries. Local custodians are not obliged to register shareholders in the share 
register of non-resident issuers if there is not a prior request from the shareholders. 
Individual shareholders being unaware of these procedures they do not request from 
the bank or a custodian to proceed so, and their shares are being treated as bearer 
shares. From this situation, the ones that gain advantages and may participate in the 
voting procedures through a proxy are the institutional investors. 
4.2.3. Lack of “push” method service 
Many shareholders whose shares are held from custodians have to seek information to 
be able to participate effectively in the voting procedures in the GMs across borders, 
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without result the most of the times. Institutional investors may have access to voting 
platforms and proxy advisory services, however individual investors, due to the high cost 
of these services, they usually not have access to the information needed. In many MSs, 
it is observed that companies although they make available the relevant information for 
the GMs according to the Directive, they do not ensure the fast access to the data on a 
“non-discriminatory basis” as they should.  
4.2.4. Fees 
Custodians are known to charge extraordinary fees for their services, and as a result, 
individual investors cannot receive not even an admission ticket for a GM98. These fees 
are correspondent to the shareholder irrespective of how many shares does he/she 
own.  
4.2.5. Documentation requirements 
Shareholders who are attending a GM abroad have to provide more data for their 
identity99 rather than when they are attending a local GM. Moreover, information 
provided by shareholders is not always processed accurately, but incorrectly, misspelt 
or with others errors. For instance, the name on the admission ticket may have been 
misspelt, or the request for a ticket was somewhere lost in the intermediary chain or 
was never known to the relevant issuer.  
In general, this is happening due to many reasons. One of them is considered the lack of 
responsibility. For example, when a shareholder has a contract with a bank, which may 
be the first custodian in the chain, a shareholder does not know the other intermediaries 
involved and so may not request explanations from them. In this case, no one has an 
obligation to refer or has an economic risk other than the first custodian. Another reason 
is the lack of automation of the proceedings regarding proxy voting for individual 
investors. All information is being transmitted manually and vocally and as a result occur 
miscommunications and errors. 
                                                 
98 Indicatively, the cost of these fees may vary from 0 to 100 EUR, depending the Member State. 
99 Such as their place of birth. 
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4.2.6. Share blocking 
Despite the provisions of the Directive, which required the MSs to terminate share 
blocking and to establish the record date system, share blocking is being continued 
regarding cross-border voting procedures. “For instance in Denmark listed shares are 
held under nominee in an omnibus account. To vote these shares, shareholders have to 
open a so-called segregated account in his or her name which may take – on a cross-
border basis – up to ten weeks. As long as the shares are held in this segregated account 
normally until the day after the general meeting, they are practically blocked from voting 
because a request to sell these shares would also have to be processed through the whole 
custodian chain which again would take a certain time”100.     
4.2.7. Interim registration requirements 
In some Member States, such as Finland and Sweden, it is required that shares are re-
registered in the name of the owner before the GM101. For the shareholder be able to 
vote and participate in the GM, he/she has to disclose his identity and ensure from the 
custodian that the re-registration has taken place. Otherwise, he/she will not be able to 
vote because the share is registered in the name of the custodian.  
4.2.8. Lack of time and cut-off dates 
Individual shareholders confront another problem, as well, because of the 
intermediaries’ chain. A shareholder who requests an admission ticket from the issuer, 
the request has to reach him before the deadline proposed in the invitation. The last 
custodian in the chain, who will transfer the request to the issuer, may not do it in time, 
and the issuer will not provide the ticket to the shareholder at the end. However, some 
custodians have their deadline dates (cut-off dates), so they can proceed all requests 
efficiently to the issuer. These cut-off dates vary according to the law of each MS, to the 
                                                 
100 Christiane Hӧlz, Report on Cross-Border Voting “Barriers to Shareholder Engagement”, (2012), 
EuroFinuse asbl., page 10. 
101 Christiane Hӧlz, Report on Cross-Border Voting “Barriers to Shareholder Engagement”, (2012), 
EuroFinuse asbl., page 11. 
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custodian’s preferences, etc. The last custodians in the chain usually set their cut-off 
dates a few days before the record date creating barriers to shareholders102.  
4.2.9. General Meeting relates issues  
Some Member States allow shareholder’s admittance after the start of the GM only for 
a specified time. As a result, a shareholder who may arrive late at the place of the GM 
due to force majeure, he will not be able to participate and vote. Other shareholders 
may find themselves in a situation where they have to leave the GM prior its start, and 
they need to transfer their voting rights to a proxy. However, in some Member States it 
is not possible, and thus shareholders lose their voting rights. 
Moreover, not in all GMs the discussions and procedures are being translated into 
English. This makes difficult the participation and voting by shareholders who reside 
across borders. 
Finally, although the Directive has established the right to shareholders to ask questions, 
this is not feasible in all MSs in the same manner. For instance, in Germany shareholders 
may ask as many questions as they want, but in France, shareholders are known to ask 
up two or three questions each.   
4.3. Principal aims of the European Commission 
The Commission in 2012 in its Communication referred to three particular main aims, 
namely enhancing transparency103, engaging shareholders104 and supporting 
companies’ growth and their competitiveness. Shareholder engagement, more 
specifically, is considered to be an exchange of minds with companies regarding issues 
such as risk, performance, strategy, corporate governance including remuneration, 
capital structure, etc. and not only a voting procedure in GMs. This dialogue between 
shareholders and companies is very crucial that is established, so long-term success is 
                                                 
102 For instance, some custodians require from shareholders a short notice, and this does not provide the 
latter adequate time to reconsider their intention to participate. 
103 The Commission focuses on the transparency in relationships between companies and investors, 
providing better information regarding corporate governance and revealing voting policies respectively.  
104 The Commission proposes that shareholders have better access in remuneration policies and related 
party transactions of the company; moreover, that asset managers, institutional investors and proxy 
advisors have some obligation to promote the efficiency in engagement.  
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promoted. Not only companies and shareholders but the whole economy benefits from 
active engagement105.  
Internal Market and Services Commissioner Michel Barnier referred to the necessity of 
a “reliable and sustainable” corporate governance. Furthermore, he highlighted that 
short-term thinking has resulted in disastrous effects and that the solution is found to 
company boards of directors (BoD) that are more effective and shareholders that 
assume their responsibilities106.  
Green Paper in this manner mentioned that shareholders’ involvement needs to be 
enhanced and they have to be more encouraged in taking long-term decisions, caring 
about the long-term performance. On the other hand, evidence showed that most of 
the shareholders’ funds are being managed by asset managers, who follow short-term 
investment strategies focusing on “turning over the portfolio” and this has led to weak 
shareholder engagement, once the interests of the formers and the latter are 
contrasting.  
In its Communication, the Commission also clarified the need for institutional investors 
to provide data regarding their engagement and voting strategies engaging them to take 
more seriously their part in the company. Moreover, it proposed to focus more on the 
remuneration policies and that payment should be connected to efficiency; that 
shareholder's control over related party transactions should be improved. At last, the 
approach of ‘comply or explain’ was introduced and mentioned to be discussed further. 
All the above were confirmed through a Press Release from the European Commission 
the same day107.  
In 2014, the Commission proposed the revision of the Shareholder Rights Directive. In 
its proposal, it mentioned more solid transparency requirements for asset managers and 
institutional investors and referred to engagement policies concerning corporations in 
which they invest. It referred to the issue of the identification of shareholders especially 
                                                 
105 European Commission, Memo “Action Plan on European company law and corporate governance: 
Frequently Asked Questions”, (Brussels, 12 December 2012). 
106 European Commission, Press Release Database, “Corporate governance framework for European 
companies: what needs to be improved?”, (Strasbourg, 5 April 2011) IP/ 11/404. 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-404_en.htm?locale=en> 
107 See further: European Commission, Press Release “Commission plans to modernise European company 
law and corporate governance”, (Brussels, 12 December 2012). <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-12-1340_en.htm> 
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in cross-border situations, and it introduced the ‘say on pay’ condition. Finally, according 
to the principle of ‘comply or explain’, a corporation when it prefers to withdraw from 
the applicable corporate governance code shall give a reason for the withdrawal. The 
Commission’s Recommendation aims to guide listed companies, investors and other 
interested parties to improve the overall quality of corporate governance statements 
published by companies108. 
Following the previously mentioned procedures, in December of 2016, the EU 
Parliament and Commission agreed on the final version of the new Directive. Companies 
would be allowed to identify their shareholders and have access to their identity 
information from any intermediary in the chain, with respect however to shareholders 
who hold more than 0,5%. Therefore, only a small population of shareholders of listed 
companies will have their identity details revealed. Better Finance, the European 
Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users, concerned about the disclosure of 
shareholders’ identity, asked the European Parliament whether the MSs may “set a 
threshold that is as low as possible, and the shareholders of the listed companies have 
access to the same information as easily as those companies do”109. Needless to say, that 
charging policies of custodians to shareholders remain high, preventing non-resident 
shareholders from participating in voting procedures in GMs via a representative or a 
proxy holder.  
On the 14th of March, 2017 the European Parliament finally voted its report on the 
revised SRD, entering into force two years after the publication in the official journal. 
The resolution was passed by 646 votes to 39, with 13 abstentions110. Its amendments 
are going to be discussed further in the next section.  
                                                 
108 European Commission, Press Release “European Commission proposes to strengthen shareholder 
engagement and introduce a “say on pay” for Europe’s largest companies”, (Brussels, 9 April 2014). 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-396_en.htm> 
109 Better Finance, The European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users, Press Release 
“Presidency and Parliament agree on review of Shareholders Rights Directive: limited improvements for 
shareholders”, (Brussels, 14 December 2016)  
110 European Parliament, Press Release “Stronger rights for shareholders in EU companies”, Plenary 
sessions, 14-03-2017 – 12:35 
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4.4. Main amendments to SRD I 
The main of all reasons for this amendment was the short-term strategies of the 
shareholders. It is the case that institutional investors, such as funds, banks and 
insurance companies hold the significant part of the shares listed in EU companies, while 
asset managers handle assets of most of these institutional investors. Both represent 
the significant part of EU economy and fail to follow long-term strategies.  
European Commission noticed that short-term strategies are observed to be 
encouraged due to situations, such as: 
• Fund managers, on average, every 1.7 years, they turn their portfolio in; 
• The evaluation of the performance of asset managers is usually accomplished 
every three months or even earlier, and as a result, they do not take into account 
the long-term performance, but they are put in pressure to perform well in short 
terms; 
• The extremely high remuneration of CEOs comparing to their weak performance 
and the troubles confronted by the company, let many shareholders dissatisfied; 
and 
• The average period of share-holding is considered to be eight months.   
This new Directive aims to encourage in general the long-term shareholder engagement.  
4.4.1. Shareholder’s identification 
For the direct and effective communication between the company and its shareholders 
to proceed, listed companies may identify their shareholders. Intermediaries are obliged 
to transmit information to and from the company, so the shareholders are facilitated to 
exercise their rights.  
Furthermore, intermediaries are obliged to offer the final shareholder’s information to 
the company, upon its request. The Directive, however, establishes an exception; the 
MSs may require that shareholders with no excess of 0.5% of shares be excluded from 
the identification obligation. 
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4.4.2. Facilitation of voting rights of shareholders 
It is known that shareholders are the key factors in a company and that they have to 
participate in the voting procedures so that development and productivity are 
improved. Complex chains of intermediaries usually hold communication between the 
company and its shareholders back, a procedure which is necessary for shareholders to 
facilitate their rights. The new Directive obliges intermediaries to pass on essential 
information from the shareholder, including retail shareholders, to the company and 
vice versa, so that shareholders may exercise their rights appropriately.  
Moreover, MSs shall ensure that shareholders can be informed, upon their request, 
whether their vote was taken into account and whether the company validly registered 
and accounted for the vote111. This obligation has also reference to third-country 
intermediaries who represent shareholders with shares in listed companies in the EU. In 
this manner, non-resident shareholders may be able to participate in the GMs of the 
company and vote effectively. 
4.4.3. Institutional investors and asset managers 
The new Directive requires institutional investors and asset managers to reveal their 
investment methods and those regarding their engagement with the companies in 
which they invest. Through this manner, they are more encouraged to follow long-term 
strategies rather than short-term, disclosing their policy on an annual basis and examine 
environmental and social issues. “The new rules will require institutional investors to 
disclose how they take the long-term interests of their beneficiaries into account in their 
investment strategies and how they incentivise their asset managers to take these long-
term interests into account. Asset managers will be required to report to the institutional 
investors for whom they manage funds how they have performed in relation to their 
mandate”112.  
                                                 
111 Osborne Clarke, Article “Amendment of Directive 2007/36/CE on the exercise of certain rights of 
shareholders in listed companies”, (30 May 2017) <http://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/amendment-
of-directive-200736ce-on-the-exercise-of-certain-rights-of-shareholders-in-listed-companies/> 
112 European Commission, Fact Sheet – “Shareholders’ rights directive Q&A”, (Brussels, 14 March 2017) 
MEMO/17/592. 
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Moreover, investors have to get along with the ‘comply or explain’ approach. More 
specifically, in case the investor does not comply with the provisions, he has to explain 
himself reasonably. This approach is applied to corporate governance and stewardship 
codes, as well. Although there is no obligation to reveal information, however, one has 
to explain why he did not proceed so. This policy will reveal how investors and managers 
accommodate with shareholder engagement in their strategies and the engagement 
activities they pursue.  
4.4.4. Proxy advisors 
Proxy advisors are companies which provide advice, research and recommend 
shareholders on how to vote in GMs. These companies specialise in analysing disclosures 
of corporations, recommend on voting procedures, especially in cases across borders 
and they get to influence shareholders decisions importantly.  
Due to the above, they are required according to the provisions of the new Directive to 
disclose information about their advisory and recommendation methods towards 
investors and to publish the applying code of conduct. This is to maintain reliable and 
high-quality recommendations.  
4.4.5. ‘Say on pay’ 
The new Directive gives voice to shareholders and “transparency and accountability 
about directors’ pay” is encouraged. The new provisions allow shareholders to have an 
opinion regarding directors’ remuneration policies, having the right to know and 
consequently influence the amount of the latters’ payment. The Directive’s aim, 
therefore, is the interaction between performance and pay. 
According to the SRD II, shareholders have the right to vote in the GM on the 
remuneration policy followed by a company for its directors. More specifically, 
shareholders can vote twice. Firstly, they vote ex-ante regarding their concerns about 
the remuneration awards to the directors in the future. This vote is considered binding, 
permitting companies to award remuneration only on the base of the policy approved. 
Member States, though, will have the right to choose the advisory approach, according 
to which, companies may not proceed based on shareholders’ vote, but they are 
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required to refer to a revised policy. The company has to publicly disclose without delay 
the remuneration policy voted by the shareholders at the GM. Secondly, they vote ex-
post regarding their concerns about the remuneration report already describing the 
remuneration awarded during the previous financial year. The particular vote is 
considered advisory, and the companies may have the possibility to replace the voting 
procedure by an argument during the GM.  
Directors’ remuneration is the key factor in adjusting the shareholders’ and directors’ 
interest assuring that director will behave according to the company’s best interest. The 
remuneration policy influences Directors' performance and this means that if the 
directors are getting awarded according to short-term incentives, it stands to reason 
that they will make short-term decisions. It is essential that the directors’ decisions align 
with the long-term aims and sustainability of a company and not with short-term 
objectives. 
4.4.6. Related party transactions 
“Transactions with related parties may cause prejudice to companies and their 
shareholders, as they may give the related party the opportunity to appropriate value 
belonging to the company”113. Consequently, the new Directive requires companies to 
disclose data of related party transactions, which nonetheless might create risks for 
minority shareholders. The companies are obliged to submit for disclosure these 
transactions, so they are approved by the shareholders in the GM or by the BoD, and 
the interests of the company are adequately protected.  
4.5. Key provisions of SRD II 
The rationale of this Directive is to reinforce the long-term focus on corporate 
governance and to restrict shortcomings. Critical issues of the provisions of the SRD II 
are commented hereunder.  
                                                 
113 European Council, Press Release (2017), Enterprise and industry, Single Market, “Shareholders' rights 
in EU companies: Council formal adoption” 173/17 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/04/03/shareholder-rights-eu-companies/> 
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4.5.1. Article 3a  
It is crucial for some companies to know the identity of its shareholders. Having this kind 
of information, they will be able, for instance, to understand better their interest, or 
forecast the result after the voting procedure in the GMs. 
Listed companies have the right to identify their shareholders114 so they can come into 
contact with them directly115. Each MS may allow a request for shareholder 
identification116, but only for those shareholders who hold no more than 0,5% of shares 
or voting rights117. However, it is indicated that while issuers of some MSs are entitled 
to initiate a process to access information on the identity of their shareholders at their 
request, issuers of other MSs receive information at the GMs or after participation in 
GMs118. Moreover, intermediaries119 may be required, upon the company’s request120, 
to provide the company with information regarding the shareholder’s identity. If the 
chain of intermediaries consists of more than one of them, the request of the company 
has to be transmitted on time between the intermediaries and the relevant information 
about the shareholder’s identity has to be transmitted on time as well to the company 
by the intermediary121.  
“Companies and intermediaries, however, are often not aware that a person has ceased 
to be a shareholder unless they have been informed by the person or have obtained that 
information through a new shareholder identification exercise, which often takes place 
only once a year in relation to the annual general meeting or other important events 
such as takeover bids or mergers”122. Therefore, they cannot store the data more than 
                                                 
114 Article 3a (1) of Directive 2017/828 
115 Recital 4 of Directive 2017/828 
116 Details of the shareholders, that have to be sent to the company, include data such as the name, 
contact details, its registration number if it is a legal person, or, if there is not any, a unique identifier 
(such as Legal Entity Identifier), the number of shares held by the shareholder and the date of acquisition. 
117 Article 3a (1) of Directive 2017/828 
118 European Securities and Markets Authority (2017), “Report on shareholder identification and 
communication systems”, ESMA31-54-435, p.19 Table 1. 
119 Article 2 (b) (d) of Directive 2017/828. “Intermediary means a person, …., a credit institution … and a 
central securities depository …, which provides services of safekeeping of shares, administration of shares 
or maintenance of securities accounts on behalf of shareholders or other persons;” 
120 Article 3a (2) of Directive 2017/828 
121 Article 3a (3) (a) of Directive 2017/828 
122 Recital 7 of Directive 2017/828 
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twelve months after the day they were aware of the fact that the specific shareholder 
ceased having this identity123, concerning some exceptions124.    
The personal data of shareholders should enable the company to communicate with 
shareholders directly, so the exercise of their rights and the engagement with the 
company can be facilitated125.  
4.5.2. Article 3b  
In general, “in the chain of intermediaries, especially when the chain involves many 
intermediaries, information is not always passed from the company to its shareholders, 
and shareholders’ votes are not always correctly transmitted to the company”126. Due to 
this, and according to the new SRD, the intermediaries have to send from the company 
to the shareholders (or the third party nominated by the shareholder) specific 
information so that shareholders may facilitate the exercise of their rights127. If the 
information is already available on the company’s website, a notice indicating where the 
information can be found on the website will suffice128. It is recorded that most of the 
listed in the EU companies make their information available through the websites, 
newspapers and generally to the public, while only a few of them communicate to the 
individual shareholders through the chain of intermediaries129. 
Furthermore, according to the SRD II, companies shall be required to transmit the 
relevant information to shareholders and intermediaries promptly, and the 
intermediaries to the shareholders without delay. However, it is recorded that most of 
the EU jurisdictions have not established deadlines for the efficient transmission of the 
information130. Intermediaries, moreover, have to transmit the information relevant to 
                                                 
123 Article 3a (4) (b) of Directive 2017/828 
124 Article 3a (4) (c) and Recital 7 of Directive 2017/828  
125 Article 3a (4) (a) of Directive 2017/828 
126 Recital 8 of Directive 2017/828 
127 Article 3b (1) of Directive 2017/828 
128 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2017), “The revised Shareholders’ Rights Directive – Overview of the 
key features”, <https://communications.freshfields.com/SnapshotFiles/2180bcf8-4b30-4598-ba11-
c087ffcd2326/Subscriber.snapshot?clid=2a2e7f78-05bd-4e83-af69-e83dbd4efb48&cid=1119f5c1-62af-
483a-8842-
c0c2c7869b17&ce=5Xvne7sqMUYuKoq4YLxEAZd7g44+QrIHdt+Y0kPluDY3bSeiW4cUrg==#identification> 
129 European Securities and Markets Authority (2017), “Report on shareholder identification and 
communication systems”, ESMA31-54-435, p.31 Table 6. 
130 European Securities and Markets Authority (2017), “Report on shareholder identification and 
communication systems”, ESMA31-54-435, p.34 Table 7. 
  -38- 
the exercise of the shareholders’ rights to the company immediately, according to the 
shareholder’s instructions131.  
The purpose of this new provision is to assure that the sending of the information will 
be treated similarly across the European Market.  
4.5.3. Article 3c  
Shareholders of listed in the EU companies shall be committed and engage in the 
corporate decisions to promote development and productivity132. Intermediaries have 
to facilitate the exercise of the rights of shareholders including the right to participate 
and vote in GMs. Shareholders may exercise these rights either by themselves or by 
nominating a third person to do so. In this case, intermediaries shall make all the 
necessary arrangements for the shareholders or the nominated third parties133, unless 
the intermediaries are nominated to do so, then “they exercise rights upon the explicit 
authorisation and instruction of the shareholders and for their benefit”134.  
Shareholders or the nominated third party, after the GM, can confirm that their votes 
have been validly taken into account by the company, upon a request135. When the 
voting procedure is by electronic means, an electronic confirmation has to be received 
by the shareholder136.  
4.5.4. Article 3d  
The Directive establishes a high level of transparency regarding the charges, such as fees 
and prices, for the services that intermediaries provide to shareholders so that equity 
investment can be promoted across the Union, and the exercise of the shareholders’ 
rights be facilitated137. Intermediaries shall publicly disclose any charges regarding the 
new provisions relating to the shareholder identification and the facilitation of the 
                                                 
131 Article 3b (4) of Directive 2017/828 
132 “Amendment of Directive 2007/36/CE on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed 
companies” (2017) <http://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/amendment-of-directive-200736ce-on-
the-exercise-of-certain-rights-of-shareholders-in-listed-companies/> 
133 Article 3c (1) (a) of Directive 2017/828 
134 Recital 9 of Directive 2017/828 
135 Article 3c (2) (b) of Directive 2017/828 
136 Article 3c (2) (a) of Directive 2017/828 
137 Recital 11 of Directive 2017/828 
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exercise of shareholders’ rights138. Discrimination between the charges and any 
differences imposed between cross-border and domestic charges may be applied only 
“where duly justified and where they reflect the variation in actual costs incurred for 
delivering the services”139 by intermediaries.  
4.5.5. Article 3e  
All the above provisions shall apply to intermediaries who do not have their registered 
office either their head office in the EU, as well. This is applied because “if third-country 
intermediaries were not subject to this Directive and did not have the same obligations 
relating to the transmission of information as Union intermediaries, the flow of 
information would risk being interrupted”140. Therefore, intermediaries who represent 
shareholders holding shares of companies having their registered offices in the EU and 
shares which are admitted to trading on markets situated in the EU are subject to these 
provisions.  
4.5.6. Article 3g  
Shareholder engagement is crucial for the development of the company, and the higher 
the involvement of them in the company is, more considerable is the improvement of 
the financial and non-financial performance of companies, including the social, 
environmental and governance factors141. Institutional investors142 and asset 
managers143 although they constitute essential shareholders of listed companies, they 
frequently not engage with companies in which they hold shares, and so capital markets 
put more pressure on short-term performance strategies, jeopardising all long-term 
goals144. For the reasons above, more transparency is needed from the institutional 
                                                 
138 Article 3d (1) of Directive 2017/828 
139 Article 3d (2) of Directive 2017/828 
140 Recital 12 of Directive 2017/828 
141 Recital 14 of Directive 2017/828 
142 According to Article 2 (e) of Directive 2017/828, institutional investor is “(i) an undertaking carrying 
out activities of life assurance … and of reinsurance …; (ii) an institution for occupational retirement..”. 
143 According to Article 2 (f) of Directive 2017/828, asset manager is “an investment firm … that provides 
portfolio management services to investors, an AIFM (alternative investment fund manager) … or a 
management company …, or an investment company that is authorized in accordance with Directive 
2009/65/EC provided that it has not designated a management company authorized under that Directive 
for its management;”  
144 Recital 15 of Directive 2017/828 
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investors and asset managers regarding their engagement policy, investment strategies 
and their implementation145.    
Therefore, MSs shall require that institutional investors and asset managers satisfy two 
requirements. Otherwise, they shall publicly disclose the reason why they did not satisfy 
them146. These two requirements are: 
a) Institutional investors and asset managers shall describe their shareholder 
engagement policy in their investment strategy, the activities they carry out to 
succeed in the engagement policy and how they manage them. Moreover, they 
need to describe how they are willing to manage actual or potential conflicts of 
interests, for instance when institutional investors or asset managers have 
business relationships with the investee companies147.  
b) Institutional investors and asset managers shall publicly disclose, on an annual 
basis, information about the implementation of their engagement policy, and 
more specifically how the voting procedure proceeded, which were the 
significant issues during the procedure and describe the usage of the proxy 
advisors’ services148.     
The abovementioned information shall be available on the institutional investors’ or 
asset managers’ website, free of charge149. 
4.5.7. Article 3h  
It is crucial that there is a medium to long-term approach, so the stewardship of assets 
is accomplished responsibly. For this reason, institutional investors are required to 
disclose publicly, on an annual basis, how the main elements of their equity investment 
strategy are consistent with the profile and duration of their liabilities and how these 
elements advance to the medium to the long-term performance of their assets150.  
When institutional investors choose asset managers151 to invest for themselves, then 
they have to disclose publicly specific information related to its arrangement with the 
                                                 
145 Recital 16 of Directive 2017/828 
146 Article 3g (1) of Directive 2017/828 
147 Article 3g (1) (a) of Directive 2017/828 
148 Article 3g (1) (b) of Directive 2017/828 
149 Article 3g (2) of Directive 2017/828 
150 Article 3h (1) of Directive 2017/828 
151 On a discretionary client-to-client basis or through a collective investment undertaking. 
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asset manager152. The herementioned information shall be available on the institutional 
investors’ website, free of charge, and shall be updated on an annual basis unless there 
are no changes153.  
4.5.8. Article 3i 
Asset managers are required to disclose, on an annual basis, to the institutional investor 
some information regarding their arrangement referred to the previous article 
discussed. This will allow the institutional investor to examine whether and how much 
he adheres to an effective policy for shareholder engagement154. It is crucial for the 
smaller and less cultured institutional investors to be able to evaluate the asset 
manager’s behaviour and policy. Consequently, asset managers have to disclose to 
institutional investors how their strategy and management of the equity will lead to the 
medium to the long-term performance of the assets. Such information shall contain: 
- reports on the critical material medium to long-term risks associated with 
the portfolio investments, on the policies used by the proxy advisors for 
engagement activities155; and 
- the composition, turnover and turnover costs of their portfolio, and their 
policy on securities lending.  
This information indicates whether the asset manager proceeds aligned with a long-
term strategy in favour of the investor’s interests. Also, on the one hand, “high portfolio 
turnover may indicate lack of conviction in investment decisions and momentum-
following behaviour” and on the other hand, “unexpectedly low turnover may signal 
inattention to risk management or a drift towards a more passive investment 
approach”156.  
                                                 
152 According to Article 3h (2) of Directive 2017/828, the information the institutional investor has to 
disclose is: (i) how it incentivises the asset manager to align its investment strategy and decisions with the 
profile and duration of the liabilities of the institutional investor, in long-term liabilities; (ii) how it 
evaluates the performance of the asset manager and its remuneration policy; (iii) how the institutional 
investor does monitor portfolio turnover costs incurred by the asset manager; and (iv) the duration of the 
arrangement. 
153 Article 3h (3) of Directive 2017/828 
154 Recital 20 of Directive 2017/828 
155 Article 3i (1) of Directive 2017/828 
156 Recital 21 of Directive 2017/828 
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Asset managers should also inform institutional investors about their decision making 
policy by an evaluation of the medium to the long-term performance of the investee 
company157 and also about any existence of conflicts of interests which may have arisen 
in connection with engagement activities, and if so, its management158. The Member 
States, at last, may require asset managers to provide the relevant information to other 
investors of the same fund, upon a request, if he does not manage the assets on a 
discretionary client-to-client basis159. This is, so all the other investors of the same fund 
can be informed. 
4.5.9. Article 3j  
Proxy advisors160 provide advice, research and recommendations on how should 
institutional investors and asset managers vote in GMs of listed companies. They may 
influence the vote of the investors or the managers, and they contribute to the 
reduction of costs of the analysis referring to the company161.  
Because of their essential role, they are required to be subject to transparency 
requirements162. More specifically, they are required to be subject to a code of conduct, 
to publicly refer to it and to report on the application of it163. Proxy advisors who do not 
apply the conduct of code, they are obliged to give a clear and reasoned explanation. 
On the other hand, if they apply the code, but they depart from a recommendation, they 
are required to indicate from which part they depart, providing alternative measures164.  
Moreover, they are required to publicly disclose, on an annual basis, information about 
the preparation of their research, recommendations and advice165, as well as to disclose 
to their client's potential conflicts of interests or business relationships influential to the 
                                                 
157 Recital 22 of Directive 2017/828 
158 Recital 23 of Directive 2017/828 
159 Article 3i (3) of Directive 2017/828 
160 According to Article 2 (b) (g) of Directive 2017/828, proxy advisor is “a legal person that analyses, on a 
professional and commercial basis, the corporate disclosure and, where relevant, other information of 
listed companies with a view to informing investors’ voting decisions by providing research, advice or 
voting recommendations that relate to the exercise of voting rights”. 
161 Recital 25 of Directive 2017/828 
162 Recital 26 of Directive 2017/828 
163 Article 3j (1) of Directive 2017/828 
164 Article 3j (1) (b) of Directive 2017/828 
165 Article 3j (2) of Directive 2017/828 
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preparation of their research and recommendations related to the voting procedures166. 
Some of the information that proxy advisors are required to disclose are:  
- characteristics of the methodologies and voting policies they apply on 
market-basis; 
- the procedures they apply, ensuring quality of the research and 
recommendations on the voting procedure; 
- how they take into account, if they do so, legal, national market, company-
specific and regulatory conditions; 
- the policy referring to prevention of potential conflicts of interest; and 
- whether they have communication with the companies and its 
stakeholders167.  
Finally, third-country proxy advisors, who do not reside in the Union neither they have 
their offices throughout the Union, may provide services through an establishment 
situated in the Union168. 
4.5.10. Article 9a  
The long-term success of a company is also due to the directors’ help169. Directors’ 
remuneration policies are matters that are up to the competence of the company, its 
shareholders and BoD and, if any, employee representatives. Remuneration is the 
crucial factor for corporations to align their interests with those of the directors and is 
fundamental that shareholders be able to express their opinion and vote on relevant 
matters170.   
For the above reason, Member States require that shareholders have the right to vote 
regarding the remuneration policy at the GM171 and the remuneration report. The 
specific vote on the remuneration policy shall be binding and companies may pay the 
                                                 
166 Article 3j (3) of Directive 2017/828 
167 Article 3j (2) of Directive 2017/828 
168 Article 3j (4) of Directive 2017/828 
169 According to Article 2 (b) (i) of Directive 2017/828, director is “(i) any member of the administrative, 
management or supervisory bodies of a company; (ii) where they are not members of the administrative, 
management or supervisory bodies of a company, the chief executive officer and, if such function exists in 
a company, the deputy chief executive officer; (iii) where so determined by a Member State, other persons 
who perform functions similar to those performed under point (i) or (ii)”. 
170 Recital 28 of Directive 2017/828 
171 Article 9a (1) OF Directive 2017/828 
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directors only according to the remuneration policy approved by the shareholders in the 
GM172. “In exceptional circumstances, though, companies may be allowed to temporarily 
derogate from the remuneration policy, provided that the policy includes the procedural 
conditions under which the derogation can be applied and specifies the elements of the 
policy from which a derogation is possible”173. Exceptional circumstances should only 
refer to situations where the remuneration policy is essential to serve the long-term 
interests and sustainability of the company as a whole or to assure its viability174. 
Furthermore, where remuneration policy has not been approved, and the GM has not 
approved either the proposed policy, the company may pay the directors according to 
its existing practices submitting newly revised policy for approval175. In case the vote is 
not binding, but advisory, companies are allowed to pay its directors according to the 
remuneration policy which has already been submitted for a vote, even if this policy is 
not approved, after all, submitting a revised policy for a vote at the next GM176.  
The remuneration policy has to advance long-term interests, business strategy and 
sustainability of the company and not linked to short-term goals177. It has to explain how 
the employment conditions of the employees and their payment were considered when 
the remuneration policy was undervote178. When the remuneration is variable, the 
company shall set clear, through its remuneration policy, comprehensive and varied 
criteria for the award, such as financial and non-financial performance criteria and 
explain how they contribute in the long-term shareholder engagement179. However, 
when the remuneration is share-based, the company shall specify, through its 
remuneration policy, vesting periods and explain how it contributes to the long-term 
shareholder engagement180. The remuneration policy, finally, shall describe the 
decision-making process, as well as the duration of the contracts and agreements.  
                                                 
172 Article 9a (2) (a) of Directive 2017/828 
173 Article 9a (4) of Directive 2017/828 
174 Recital 30 of Directive 2017/828, Article 9a (4) (b) of Directive 2017/828 
175 Article 9a (2) (b) of Directive 2017/828 
176 Article 9a (3) of Directive 2017/828 
177 Recital 29 of Directive 2017/828 
178 Article 9a (6) (b) of Directive 2017/828 
179 Article 9a (6) (c) of Directive 2017/828 
180 Article 9a (6) (d) of Directive 2017/828 
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The shareholders will have the right to vote every time there is a material change or in 
any case at least every four years181. 
4.5.11. Article 9b  
For the remuneration policy to be ensured, shareholders shall have the right to vote on 
the company’s remuneration report182. The report should be clear and understandable 
and should provide a comprehensive overview of the remuneration awarded to 
individual directors during the last financial year183. “In particular, the compulsory 
character of the ex-post vote has been strongly criticised because of the uncertainty 
created for top executives since the payment of their variable and exceptional 
remuneration is made conditional upon ratification by shareholders, even if it is perfectly 
in line with the remuneration policy voted the year before”184. On the other hand, the 
vote of the shareholders may be only advisory. However, the company has to explain in 
the next remuneration report how the shareholders’ vote was taken into account185.  
When it comes to small and middle-sized companies, MSs may provide that instead of 
the voting procedure, the remuneration report may be submitted for discussion in the 
GM, and the company has to explain in the next remuneration report how the discussion 
was taken into account186. 
                                                 
181 Article 9a (5) of Directive 2017/828 
182 The remuneration report shall include the following: (i) the total remuneration split out by component, 
explanation regarding how the remuneration aligns with the remuneration policy followed, how it 
commits to the long-term company’s performance, how the criteria regarding the performance were 
applied; (ii) the annual alterations relating to the remunerations of the company’s performance and the 
average remuneration of full-time employees, except the directors, for at least the last five financial years; 
(iii) the remuneration awarded to individual directors not only of the company but from any other 
undertaking belonging to the same group. If the remuneration of the latter were excluded from the 
report, then there would be a risk that companies would try to circumvent the requirements of the 
Directive, providing hidden remuneration through a controlled undertaking (according to Recital 35 of 
Directive 2017/828); (iv) the number of shares and options offered or granted; primary conditions for the 
exercise of the rights including the exercise price and date; (v) information about possibilities of reclaiming 
variable remuneration, alterations accomplished by the company regarding remuneration policy and an 
explanation of the alterations and the exceptional circumstances; and (vi) information about possibilities 
of reclaiming variable remuneration, alterations accomplished by the company regarding remuneration 
policy and an explanation of the alterations and the exceptional circumstances. 
183 Article 9b (1) of Directive 2017/828 
184 Pietrancosta, Alain, “Say on Pay: The New French Legal Regime in Light of the Shareholders’ Rights 
Directive II” (November 5, 2017). German-French Symposium on Company Law and Capital Markets Law 
Paris – July 6/7, 2017 -- Revue trimestrielle de Droit financier - Corporate Finance and Capital Markets Law 
Review, 2017 n° 3, p. 105. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3065673> 
185 Article 9b (4) (a) of Directive 2017/828 
186 Article 9b (4) (b) of Directive 2017/828 
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The remuneration report has to be publicly available on the company’s website for a 
ten-year period187, so shareholders have easy access and potential investors and 
stakeholders can be informed respectively188. Member States may require companies to 
publish the report by other means, as well. Such disclosure is imposed on an individual 
basis, to promote corporate transparency and directors’ accountability. This disclosure 
will enable shareholders to facilitate their voting rights and have a ‘say on pay’ based on 
each director’s performance189 taking into account the performance of the company 
overall. Publication of remuneration report will enable not only shareholders but 
potential investors and stakeholders, too.   
It is essential that director’s data that is included in the remuneration report not offend 
against provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation190 or not refer to the family 
situation of individual directors191. More specifically, remuneration components such as 
child or family allowances may be referred, where applicable, however, not the ground 
on which they were granted192.  Personal data is disclosed to promote corporate 
transparency, directors’ accountability and shareholders’ right to have a ‘say on pay’193, 
concerning MS’s law regarding disclosure of directors’ data for other purposes194.  
4.5.12. Article 9c  
The company and its shareholders may be affected by transactions with persons related 
to the company or directors may be placed in a conflict position. This is because 
transactions with related parties may create harm to companies and their shareholders, 
due to the desire of the related party to appropriate value of the company195. It is vital 
that there are safeguards, so companies’ and shareholders’ interests are protected. This 
                                                 
187 According to Recital 41 of Directive 2017/828, “At the end of 10-year period, the company should 
remove any personal data from the remuneration report or cease to disclose the remuneration report 
publicly as a whole. Following that period access to such personal data could be necessary for other 
purposes, such as in order to exercise legal actions”. 
188 Article 9b (5) (a) of Directive 2017/828 
189 Article 9b (1) of Directive 2017/828 
190 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 
191 Article 9b (2) of Directive 2017/828 
192 Recital 36 of Directive 2017/828 
193 Article 9b (3) (a) of Directive 2017/828 
194 Article 9b (3) (c) of Directive 2017/828 
195 Recital 42 of Directive 2017/828 
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is the reason why material related party transaction should be submitted for approval 
from the shareholders or the administrative or supervisory body of the company196.  
According to the Directive, MSs should define what does material transaction mean, 
taking into consideration (i) the influence that the transaction may have on the decision 
taken by the shareholders and (ii) the risk that it may create for the company and the 
shareholders who are not a related party, including the minority197. When a director or 
a shareholder is a related party, then the shareholder or the director shall not participate 
in the voting procedure or the approval198. However, shareholders who are a related 
party may be allowed to participate in the voting procedure provided that national law 
assures safeguards which will be applied prior or during the voting procedure, so 
interests of shareholders, who are not a related party, and the company may be 
protected199.  
Companies have to publicly disclose material transactions with related parties the latest 
on the conclusion of the transaction200. A public announcement is crucial so 
shareholders, employees, creditors and other interested parties may “be informed of 
potential impacts that such transactions may have on the value of the company”201. 
Member States may require that this disclosure is accompanied by a report from the 
company’s and shareholders’ aspect, who are not related parties. This will define 
whether or not the transaction is fair and reasonable, and will explain on which 
assumptions it is based on together with the methods. The report, more specifically, 
shall be produced by (i) the supervisory or administrative body of the company, (ii) an 
independent third party or (iii) the audit committee or any committee which is 
participated by independent directors202.  
                                                 
196 Article 9c (4) (a) of Directive 2017/828 
197 Article 9c (1) of Directive 2017/828 
198 Article 9c (4) (c) of Directive 2017/828 
199 Article 9c (4) (d) of Directive 2017/828 
200 According to Article 9c (2) of Directive 2017/828, such disclosure shall include at least the name of the 
related party, the date and the value of the transaction and any other information essential to assess the 
fairness of the transaction 
201 Recital 44 of Directive 2017/828 
202 Article 9c (3) of Directive 2017/828 
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4.6. A comparative approach to the US system  
In the United States, court decisions and legislative enactments from the State the 
corporation is situated compose together their company law. Unlike EU legislation, the 
US compose their securities law in the same manner, while there is the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which serves the federal securities law203. The US company 
law, thus, presents some similarities and comparisons to the European law system204. 
Because in US companies there is no active shareholder presence, which may control 
their governance, proxies are regularly needed to ensure shareholders for the quorum 
at the GM, to proceed to any necessary actions. The SEC, particularly, has powers on 
regulating proxies205, which they concentrate on disclosure requirements when publicly 
traded corporations require proxies206. Moreover, it is crucial that is mentioned the issue 
of proxy fights207. Through a proxy fight a decision in favour of the proxies may be 
succeeded on issues of policy changes208, managers are eventually managed either by 
influencing their behaviour or resulting into their replacement209 or other effects may 
take place.  
Regarding the EU provisions about equal treatment, the US system does not prescribe 
specific rules. However, the federal proxy rules ensure disclosure requirements and 
overall shareholder protection. Provisions regarding the abolition of share blocking, the 
prior notice for participation at the GM and the facilitation of the exercise of proxy 
voting rights are similar to the Europeans. Furthermore, electronic means are also 
encouraged in US system in all procedures, allowing shareholders to appoint proxies 
through the internet.  
                                                 
203 Louis Loss, Joel Seligman & Troy Paredes, Securities Regulation, (4th ed. 2006) 
204 Pinto, Arthur R., “The European Union's Shareholder Voting Rights Directive from an American 
Perspective: Some Comparisons and Observations” (September 15, 2008). Fordham International Law 
Journal, Vol. 32, 2008; Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 117. Available at SSRN: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1268454> 
205 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b) 
206 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (regulating solicitation of proxies). 
207 Proxy fights occur when a group of shareholders attempt to join each other or other groups of 
shareholders to discuss a unanimous vote on issues pending to be discussed in a meeting, while they 
desire to oppose against or have an effect on the company’s management. 
208 Arthur R. Pinto & Douglas M. Branson, “Understanding Corporate Law” § 5.05[C] [2] (2d ed. 2004). 
209 Frank H. Easterbrook, “Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence”, 9 Del. J. 
Corp. L. 540 (1984). 
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On the other hand, the right to ask questions established in the SRD does not reflect the 
American approach, since if a shareholder is prevented from setting a question does not 
constitute a breach of the law210.  For an issue to be set on an agenda for further 
discussion and vote in a meeting, it shall constitute a proper subject under state law211. 
Shareholders adjust mainly to voting issues regarding the election of the board members 
whereas directors usually set the agenda. In case shareholders desire to elect directors 
of their choice, they will have to afford the costs, such as soliciting proxies212.  Upon 
soliciting proxies, through proxy fights, shareholders can exercise the right of expression 
and thus propose non-binding resolutions so they can influence the board213.  
 
                                                 
210 David A. Drexler, Lewis S. Black Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Delaware Corporate Law and Practice § 
24.05[1] (2007) ("Statutory requirements for meetings are sketchy. While there are fairly extensive 
provisions dealing with such matters as record dates, notice, and quorum requirements, few directions are 
provided for what may or must occur at the meeting itself."). 
211 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211 (b), (2007). 
212 Lisa M. Fairfax, “Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy”, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 72 
(2008) (discussing the legal and policy issues); 
213 Arthur R. Pinto & Douglas M. Branson, “Understanding Corporate Law”, § 5.05[F]  (2d ed. 2004). 
  -51- 
5. Critical Assessment and Proposals  
The two Directives regarding shareholders’ rights attempted to accommodate the 
exercise of their rights and promote shareholders’ engagement with the company. Both, 
although they introduced and established provisions, assisting the existent issues, 
however, they resulted in some deficiencies. In this chapter, some of them may be 
discussed, and some proposals shall be deposited.    
5.1. Critical Assessment 
There is observed a significant effort to promote shareholders’ engagement through the 
SRD’s and now the SRD’s II provisions, but with no success. According to SRD I, 
shareholders have the opportunity to put items on the agenda and set questions using 
electronic means across borders. Nevertheless, this provision or the importance 
generally of any issue tabled for resolution at a GM, does not affect the attendance of 
the shareholders214. On the other hand, according to SRD II, shareholders can always be 
informed adequately and timely by the intermediaries so that they can exercise their 
rights more effectively. However, the provisions of the new Directive do not seem that 
they solve the problem of the complexity of intermediaries’ chain neither however they 
prevent the existence of this kind of chains.  
To ensure the improvement of the cross-border voting procedures and its effectiveness 
upon EU legislation, there needs to exist harmonisation across the MSs’ law systems. 
Although many MSs have already established the possibility to vote via a proxy holder, 
however, the procedures are now more complicated than before. As a result, many 
shareholders, especially individuals, due to high costs and complexity in these 
procedures choose not to participate and exercise their rights.  
Moreover, the revised Directive emphasises on new transparency requirements 
concerning asset managers and institutional investors. Asset managers are required to 
disclose their level of portfolio turnover while institutional investors to disclose their 
                                                 
214 Van der Elst, Christoph, “Shareholder Rights and Shareholder Activism: The Role of the General Meeting 
of Shareholders”, (March 7, 2012). ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 188/2012. Available at SSRN: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2017691> 
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engagements with asset managers. However, suggesting the implementation of a 
particular strategy by the abovementioned, considering that diversity is prevalent in the 
management of investment funds by asset managers rather discourages long-term 
performance and shareholder engagement goals215.   
Concerning ‘say on pay’, it is considered that the size of an institution’s position, for 
instance, affects the institutional vote. More specifically, positions held based on small 
amounts of shareholdings or little investment amounts, provide little management 
support, since they have small incentives and limited opportunities to take part in 
governance structures of the company. The support gets smaller when there is a 
substantial blockholder independent from any Institutional Shareholder Services’ 
recommendations. On the other hand, it is noticed that ‘say on pay’ vote is frequently 
used to confront management when the corporate structure is dispersed. To sum up, 
following the abovementioned thoughts and observations, minor institutional investors, 
who consist of a significant amount of the shareholdings and the ownership of the 
company, influence vitally the corporate governance216.  
Lastly, the over-disclosure of the shareholders’ identity-related information or the 
directives’ identity-related information it may come across to the data protection 
perspective in the future. Although the SRD II mentions the consideration of the GDPR217 
when applying the SRD II provisions, however, this does not fortify an application of the 
regulation, and this may lead to a moderately opposite result than a more profound 
engagement.  
                                                 
215 Sergey Dolomanov, “Shareholders’ Rights Directive: Controversial Transparency Requirements Set to 
Affect Asset Managers”, William Fry, 31 July 2015 <https://www.williamfry.com/newsandinsights/news-
article/2015/07/31/shareholders-rights-directive-controversial-transparency-requirements-set-to-
affect-asset-managers> 
216 Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam and Wermers, Russ, Do Institutional Investors Monitor Their Large vs. Small 
Investments Differently? Evidence from the Say-on-Pay Vote (February 2018). European Corporate 
Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 541/2017. Available at 
SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3096745> 
217 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
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5.2. Proposals 
For individual shareholders to be activated and participate in all kinds of procedures, it 
is essential not to result in high costs. A widely accessible European platform disclosing 
adequate information to shareholders regarding corporate structure and GM 
conventions and a prompt and affordable procedure for admissions to the GM may urge 
more shareholders to be active.  
Moreover, a fixed rate of intermediary or proxy charging fees would render convenience 
to shareholders to attend at GMs or exercise their votes. The choice of a free of charge 
service by the intermediaries would be the most ideal for the shareholders, however, in 
the today’s real economy, this would seem imaginary scenario.   
Additionally, the company's inability to compensate directors adequately after the rapid 
economic crisis may constitute the reason for a review of the practices followed by a 
company. Companies should ensure that shareholders receive sufficient information so 
they can make sophisticated ‘say on pay’ decisions, while they should give the freedom 
to the BoD to forward the company’s interests. High remuneration policies may 
constitute the vital issue of discussion of the GMs and distract shareholders from 
desiring to discuss much more severe subjects concerning the company. 
Last but not least, European institutions should consider developing the Directive and 
its fundamental provisions into a Regulation. Time has shown that regarding essential 
issues ‘harmonisation’ is not adequate to solve problems and thus there is a need for a 
stricter frame and a European law parallel to all Member States.   
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6. Conclusions 
Shareholders own the company, but the board manages the company. Through the first 
Directive and then through the second one, an attempt was made that shareholders 
engage more with the corporate governance, having no success. 
In this dissertation, I put an effort describing the features of each key Directive related 
to the exercise of shareholders’ rights. It is concluded that the first Directive established 
some provisions for the shareholders’ interest and, in order to participate more actively 
whether they reside in a Member State or not. Through the Directive, shareholders are 
entitled to ask questions, put items on the agenda and be informed prior the general 
meetings. However, although there was an attempt to establish a record date, so 
shareblocking is abolished, it is concluded that this issue did not vanish. Following the 
first Directive, in 2017, Directive 2017/828 was adopted, and new provisions were 
introduced. Shareholders are able to vote on directors’ remuneration policies, and 
relationships between asset managers, proxy holders and institutional investors are 
characterised by transparency. None of these provisions nonetheless managed to 
promote shareholders’ engagement and many of the Directives’ deficiencies are 
mentioned and analysed through the dissertation, and mainly in chapter 5.     
It is highly recommended and virtually certain that European Institutions come across 
with a proposal of new Directive to approach critical concerns of shareholders and 
promote their engagement and participation in the future. High charging fees and 
complex intermediaries’ chains remain the focus of all problematics.  
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